

**UNTAPPED POTENTIAL IN THE STUDY OF  
NEGOTIATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS**

HANNAH RILEY BOWLES

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

Tel: (617) 496-4717

*email: hannah\_bowles@harvard.edu*

KATHLEEN L. MCGINN

Harvard Business School

Soldiers Field Park

Boston, MA 02163

Tel: (617) 495-6901

*email: kmcginn@hbs.edu*

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**ABSTRACT**

Negotiation is a process that creates, reinforces, and reduces gender inequality in organizations, yet the study of gender in negotiation has little connection to the study of gender in organizations. We review the literature on gender in job negotiations from psychology and organizational behavior, and propose ways in which this literature could speak more directly to gender inequality in organizations by incorporating insights from research on gender in intra-household and collective bargaining. Taken together, these literatures illuminate how negotiations at the individual, household, and collective levels may contribute to the construction and deconstruction of gender inequality in organizations.

## **UNTAPPED POTENTIAL IN THE STUDY OF NEGOTIATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS**

What could research on gender in negotiation tell us about gender inequality in organizations? The study of gender in negotiation within the organizational behavior field has blossomed theoretically and empirically in recent years, but it remains effectively divorced from the study of organizations. Negotiation scholars speculate about the implications of largely laboratory-based research on gender in negotiation for organizationally relevant phenomena, such as the gender wage gap and glass ceiling (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Bowles & McGinn, 2005b; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, in press; Solnick, 2001; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Organizational scholars describe negotiation as a fundamental mechanism of coordination within organizations (Barley, 1991; Graham, 1995; Jaffee, 2007; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Pfeffer, 1981; Stogdill, 1953), and speculate about how gender and other ascribed identities influence implicit negotiations over organizational resources (e.g., Brass, 1985; Miller, Lincoln, & Olson, 1981). But, in spite of the complementarities across negotiation research and organizational studies, the twain rarely meet.

In this chapter, we review research from psychology and organizational behavior on gender in job negotiations. The broader literature on gender in negotiation has been reviewed extensively elsewhere (for recent reviews, see Kray & Babcock, 2006; Kray & Thompson, 2005). We provide an overview of trends in the broader field and then focus on the work on gender and job negotiations, which we see as most germane to the challenge of relevance to research on gender inequality in organizations.

The three most commonly investigated indicators of gender inequality in organizations are the gender gap in wages (e.g., Barry, 1985; Blau & Kahn, 2006; Budig & England, 2001;

Goldin, 1990; Wood, Corcoran, & Courant, 1993), the gender gap in management and leadership positions (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 2007; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Wright, Baxter, & Birkelund, 1995), and the (closely related) sex segregation of occupations (e.g., Bellas, 1994; Bielby & Baron, 1986; Doeringer & Piore, 1985; Reskin, 1984; Reskin & Ross, 1992; Thurow, 1975). Research on gender in job negotiations speaks directly to the unexplained gender gap in earnings by illuminating psychological effects of gender on compensation negotiations. Research on gender in job negotiations also offers potential explanations for the asymmetric distribution of other types of potentially negotiable organizational resources and career opportunities (e.g., budgets, training, developmental work experiences), which contributes to the gender gap in management and leadership positions. We believe that the research on gender in job negotiations offers valuable insights for organizational researchers interested in the interpersonal-level mechanisms of gender inequality in organizations (for instance, see Reskin's [2003] call for research on the mechanisms of ascriptive inequality). We also believe, however, that the potential for this literature to explain the relationship between negotiation and gender inequality in organizations is woefully constrained by its scope of investigation.

We therefore include in this review two additional literatures on the role of negotiation in perpetuating or mitigating gender inequalities: (1) research from economics and sociology on intra-household bargaining and (2) studies from labor relations on gender in collective bargaining. We propose that the literature on gender in negotiation from psychology and organizational behavior could speak more broadly and persuasively about negotiation as a process that creates, reinforces, and reduces gender inequality in organizations if it incorporated some of the insights and questions from these literatures. In particular, the research on intra-household bargaining and gender in collective bargaining provides important perspectives on

how negotiations influence the broader social division of labor between the sexes and the gendered structure of work practices within organizations.

The literature on intra-household bargaining sheds light on the “backstage” negotiations (Goffman, 1959) that precede and accompany the performance of job negotiations. Negotiation researchers in psychology and organizational behavior tend to circumscribe the job negotiation phenomenon to interactions between candidates and employers. In doing so, they succumb to the compelling simplicity—and falsehood—of the public/private dichotomy between the world of work and the household realm (Martin, 1990). The occlusion of the private realm from the researchers’ focus impedes understanding of the broader role of gender in the context of job negotiations beyond its influence on the psychology of social interaction. As Carol Rose argues, negotiation theory should be particularly well suited for analyzing the inextricability of household relations and organizational employment because “it is simply elementary in bargain [*sic*] theory that one’s ability to bargain in any context hinges quite sharply on one’s alternatives outside that context” (1995: 561).

Studies of gender issues in collective bargaining shed light on the use of negotiations to redefine jobs and to reconfigure some of the work structures and practices that create and reinforce gender inequities in organizations. In contrast, studies of gender in job negotiations tend to treat the parameters of the work itself as relatively fixed and objective rather than labile and socially determined. Laboratory studies experimentally control the definition of the work and field studies statistically control for work labels (e.g., job function or title). In its depiction of how labor-management negotiations erect, reinforce, or break down barriers to equal employment opportunities, the collective bargaining literature offers a potential theoretical bridge between the interpersonal and institutional mechanisms of gender inequality, such as the

sex segregation of occupations and questions of comparable worth (Blumberg, 1984; Goldin, 1990; Reskin, 1984).

We based our review on a search of peer reviewed articles in ABI Inform, Business Source Complete, JSTOR Sociology Journals, and PsycINFO published 1978-2007, using search terms related to gender and negotiation (i.e., [gender OR sex] AND [“bargain” OR “negotiat”]) and compensation, household, or collective bargaining (e.g., wage, salary, compensation, pay, home, household, labor, labor relations, labor AND contract). From this initial search we removed articles on sexual behavior (e.g., condom use), intra-household bargaining in developing countries, international peace negotiations (e.g., gender in Israeli-Palestinian conflict), identity negotiation (e.g., self-construction of sexual identity), and other articles not relevant to gender or negotiation. We supplemented this original search with additional research that we encountered in the course of the review, and drew upon theoretically relevant literature from economics, psychology, sociology, labor relations, and organizational studies.

In expanding this review beyond the bounds of research on gender in negotiation from psychology and organizational behavior, we ventured into what was for us previously unfamiliar territory. We beg, in advance, the patience of those more expert than we are in the fields of intra-household bargaining and collective bargaining for any misconstruals, oversights or lack of depth in our discussions of these areas. We took this risk in the hope that this chapter would motivate deeper learning at the intersection of these realms.

### **GENDER IN NEGOTIATION: GENERAL THEORY AND FINDINGS**

Rubin and Brown (1975) conducted the first comprehensive review of research on gender in negotiation in their chapter on “Bargainers as Individuals.” Buoyed by a surge in individual-difference research among psychologists, negotiation researchers had tested for stable

personality differences (e.g., gender, authoritarianism) that would explain negotiation behavior. This initial wave of individual-difference research in negotiation left in its wake a clutter of contradictory findings. Searching for a personality-based explanation for the confusing array of gender results, Rubin and Brown tentatively proposed that women were more interpersonally oriented than men—leading them to respond more cooperatively than men in many instances and to react more competitively in others. By the 1980s, contemporary feminist ideals of minimalist sex differences forcefully conflicted with such personality attributions (Eagly, 1995). Standing on weak evidence, Rubin and Brown's (1975) interpretation lacked staying power and a virtual silence fell upon the topic of gender in negotiation for more than a decade.

In the 1990s, a second wave of research on gender in negotiation emerged, again following developments in the larger field of psychology. The “gender-in-context” perspective in social psychological research (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Deaux & Major, 1987) interpreted gender-linked social behaviors “as multiply determined, highly flexible, and context dependent” (Deaux et al., 1987: 369). Proponents of this perspective argued that men's and women's behavior was not only a function of the distal influence of social roles (Eagly, 1987) and status differences (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977), but also of the proximal cues within the immediate situation, such as the gendered expectations of one's interaction partner or the activation of gender schema within the context of interaction (Deaux et al., 1987). Negotiation scholars implicitly, if not explicitly, adopted this perspective and called for analysis of the influence of situational factors on gender in negotiation (Stuhlmacher et al., 1999; Thompson, 1990; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998; Watson, 1994).

Leading this revival, Alice Stuhlmacher and Amy Walters published two meta-analyses testing for potential moderators of gender effects on negotiation behavior and performance.

Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of gender and negotiation behavior based on 62 research reports published between 1961 and 1996. They found that women were significantly less competitive than men in “explicit bargaining” situations in which parties communicate directly to resolve some conflict of interest. Gender effects in matrix-based economic games were less consistent. Matrix games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, are decision-making exercises in which two or more players make independent and, generally, anonymous decisions, the economic implications of which are contingent on the decisions of the other player(s) (e.g., cooperate, defect). Most studies using matrix games showed women’s behavior to be more cooperative than men’s, but some showed the opposite. Further analyses of the matrix-game studies indicated that the tendency for stereotypic gender differences in behavior and payoffs increased with the potential for communication between the parties.

In a later meta-analysis of 21 studies of explicit negotiations involving male and female adult North Americans, Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) found that men attained significantly higher individual payoffs in negotiations than women. Cautious of the small number of studies in their sample, Stuhlmacher and Walters reported tentative support for the propositions that gender differences favoring men in negotiation performance were stronger in situations that aligned with the masculine stereotype of the self-interested, competitive negotiator (i.e., in distributive vs. integrative negotiations) and in which stereotypical status differences between the sexes were highlighted (e.g., male employer and female candidate).

More recently, Kray and Thompson (2005) conducted an extensive qualitative review of the literature on gender in negotiation. Kray and Thompson’s review revealed a range of potential moderators of gender effects in negotiation, including the negotiating domain (i.e., personal vs. work negotiations) (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Major, Bylsma, &



Cozzarelli, 1989), the gender composition of the dyad (Klein & Willerman, 1979; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001), the negotiator's representation role (i.e., negotiating for self vs. other) (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005a; Wade, 2001), the presence and surveillance of constituents (Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & Van Slyck, 1986; Skotko, Langmeyer, & Lundgren, 1974), and the activation of stereotypes (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray et al., 2001). In most studies men outperformed women in terms of the economic payoffs from negotiation, but a number of studies revealed conditions under which women's negotiation payoffs matched or exceeded men's. These included situations in which negotiators were advocating for others as opposed to themselves (Bowles et al., 2005a) or in which women were reacting against explicitly stated stereotypes favoring men in negotiation (Kray et al., 2001). Kray and Thompson (2005) concluded that the negotiating table is male dominated—both in terms of the economic claims that men make relative to women and in terms of the stereotypically masculine social conception of the attributes of effective negotiators—but that negotiation outcomes are driven by situational factors rather than predetermined by stable, innate differences between the sexes.

Coincident with the rise of this social psychological “gender-in-context” perspective, there also emerged a feminist perspective on the study of gender in negotiation. Feminist scholars challenged the foundations of negotiation theory and empirical research as fundamentally gendered (e.g., Gray, 1994a; Gray, 1994b; Kolb & Putnam, 1997; Putnam & Kolb, 2000). The basic argument was that male hegemony privileged masculine over feminine conceptions of negotiation—individualistic, competitive and transactional over collectivistic, cooperative and relational—and made the male experience the norm. Research on gender in negotiation, they argued, had become a study of women's deviance relative to the male standard (Gray, 1994b; Kolb et al., 1997).

Feminists also criticized the failure of negotiation researchers to take into consideration how differences in economic and social status between the sexes might influence negotiation (Kolb et al., 1997). For instance, drawing inspiration from broader feminist critiques of gender relations in organizations (e.g., Acker, 1990; Calas & Smircich, 1992; Ely, 1999), Kolb and Williams (2000) proposed that the effects of gender on negotiation expectations and performance reflect the unspoken dynamics in gendered power relations within organizations. Congruently, other reviewers of the negotiation literature, building from theories of proportional representation (Kanter, 1977b), social role theory (Eagly, 1987), and status (Berger et al., 1977), have argued that gender effects in negotiation can be accurately interpreted only in light of the broader social structures of gender relations (Karakowsky & Miller, 2006; Watson, 1994).

In sum, the literature on gender in negotiation started with a premise of stable, personality-based gender differences in negotiation behavior. Later research rejected hypotheses of stable sex-based differences in negotiation behavior, providing substantial evidence that gender effects in negotiation are systematically contingent on situational factors. The broader theoretical development of the study of gender in negotiation suggests that these situational moderators of gender effects in negotiation are rooted in the larger structure of gender relations in organizations and society.

### **GENDER AND JOB NEGOTIATIONS**

The literature on gender and job negotiations reflects the same overall pattern of results found in the broader literature on gender in negotiation. There is a somewhat inconsistent tendency for negotiation behavior and outcomes to favor men over women in terms of economic payoffs and there is accompanying evidence of situational moderators of these gender effects. We begin this section with an overview of the results of field studies of salary outcomes at

organizational entry. We organize the rest of the review in terms of two primary categories of theoretical explanations for gender effects in job negotiations: pay expectations and stereotypes.

### **Salary Differences at Organizational Entry**

The results of field research on gender differences in salaries secured at organizational entry are mixed, but tend to suggest that male managers and professionals negotiate higher starting pay than their female peers. Researchers attribute these gender differences to unequal rates in the propensity to negotiate initial offers as well as to differing effectiveness in bargaining for higher pay. For example, Babcock and Laschever (2003) found significant gender differences among graduating professional students in the propensity to negotiate but no gender difference in negotiation performance. Seven percent of women as compared to 57 percent of men negotiated for higher salaries, and those who negotiated gained an average 7.4 percent over their starting offer (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). These findings of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate were replicated in another field study of MBA students' job market experiences and in multiple laboratory experiments (Small et al., in press). Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found the opposite effects. Analyzing data from a job search and outcome survey of 205 graduating MBA students from an Ivy League business school, they found no gender difference in the propensity to negotiate. However, controlling for the amount of the candidates' starting offers and total number of outside offers, the men's gross payoff from negotiation was 60 percent higher than the women's.

Other studies report no gender differences in either the propensity to negotiate or in the payoffs to negotiating one's starting offer. For instance, the results of a survey study of 301 undergraduate business students indicated that 21 percent of the graduates had attempted to negotiate their salary offers, and that there were no gender differences in the reported propensity

to negotiate or payoffs from negotiation (O'Shea & Bush, 2002). Another study analyzing ten years of salary negotiation data from a U.S. high technology company found significant race but no gender differences in the candidates' percentage increases in salary over their starting offer from the firm (Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000).

Numerous studies provide indirect support for the proposition that male managers and professionals negotiate higher salaries at organizational entry than their female peers. Gerhart (1990) analyzed the current and starting salaries of 4,617 managers and professionals in a major industrial and consumer products company. Controlling for year of hire, work experience, education, tenure, performance and job title, he found that women's relative salary disadvantage as compared to men at the time of hire accounted for most of the gender difference in current salary. Based on a two-year longitudinal study of 610 managers and professionals working in Fortune 500 companies, Brett and Stroh (1997) demonstrated that men made substantial compensation gains by transferring organizations, whereas an external labor market strategy had no significant benefits for women's compensation. Dreher and Cox (2000) replicated and extended Brett and Stroh's (1997) work with an examination of data from an ethnically diverse sample of 758 MBA program graduates. They found that the benefits of an external labor market strategy accrued only to White men and not to women or minority MBAs.

In an attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings on gender effects in compensation negotiations at organizational entry, Bowles et al. (2005a) analyzed job search and outcome data for 525 graduating MBA students. Controlling for job function, job market activity (e.g., number of job applications and job offers), previous work experience (e.g., pre-MBA salary, relevant work experience, total years of work experience), geographic location of the position, and job preferences (e.g., dual-career concerns, work-life balance, high salary), they found that women

accepted salary offers that were five percent lower than those accepted by their male peers. However, situational factors moderated these results. In those industries in which MBA students had relatively good information about appropriate salary standards (69 percent of the sample), there were no significant gender differences in negotiation outcomes. In those industries in which MBAs had relatively poor information about salary standards (31 percent of the sample), the women accepted salaries that were ten percent lower than the men's. Consistent with Mischel's (1977) classic work on strong vs. weak situations, Bowles and colleagues demonstrated in follow-on experimental studies that decreasing ambiguity with regard to the standards for negotiated agreements reduces the potential for gender differences in negotiated outcomes.

### **Theoretical Explanations for Gender Effects in Job Negotiations**

The literature on gender in negotiation offers multiple complementary explanations for why men tend to claim more value in compensation negotiations than women. Our reading of this literature suggests that all of these explanations relate back—directly or indirectly—to men's and women's relative social and economic status. Gender differences in social and economic status inform expectations about how much men and women should be paid (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984b; Ostroff & Atwater, 2003; Rosen & Mericle, 1979), how men and women should comport themselves (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jackman, 1994; Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977), and which sex is likely to be the more effective negotiator in work-related contexts (Kray et al., 2001; Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004). Correspondingly, we organize the following review in terms of the effects of pay expectations and prescriptive and descriptive sex stereotypes on gender differences in job negotiation behavior and outcomes.

**Pay expectations.** Experimental economist Sara Solnick used a simple matrix-based simulation, the Ultimatum Game, to demonstrate how gender influences pay expectations. In an Ultimatum Game, Player 1 receives a sum of money (e.g., \$10), and has to decide how much of the money to keep and how much to share with Player 2. Player 2 then decides whether Player 1's allocation of the money is acceptable. If Player 2 rejects Player 1's allocation of the money, neither Player gets any money. If Player 2 accepts Player 1's allocation of the money, the two players divide the money as proposed by Player 1. The rules of the game are common knowledge. In Solnick's research, as in most studies using the Ultimatum Game, there is no direct communication between the players. In two separate studies, Solnick found that participants who knew the gender of the other player allocated more money (as Player 1) to men than to women and were willing to accept less money (as Player 2) from men than from women. Consequently, men earned more money than women (Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). Solnick observed that "players seem to *expect* that women would be satisfied with a smaller share" (2001: 199, italics included in original). Reinforcing Solnick's interpretation, one field survey of more than 1,500 managers, union officials, and compensation administrators showed that 44 percent of respondents perceived women's willingness to work for less money than men to be a "very" or "extremely" important cause of the gender gap (Gerhart et al., 1991; Rynes, Rosen, & Mahoney, 1985).

Building upon work on pay expectations, Belliveau (2005) proposed that women receive lower salary offers than men when employers believe that women lack comparative information on men's compensation. To test this proposition, Belliveau collected data on the job market experiences of women from similarly ranked single-sex and co-educational colleges. Controlling for the gender diversity of their job search networks and a range of other human capital

indicators (e.g., GPA, undergraduate major, job offers in job category, college reputation), she found that women from single-sex institutions received significantly lower offers than their peers from a co-ed institution. Belliveau interpreted this finding as “a manifestation of recruiter assumptions about the women’s differential access to wage information” (2005: 146).

Research on the entitlement effect shows that gender also influences the pay expectations men and women hold for themselves (Callahan-Levy et al., 1979; Major et al., 1984b; McFarlin, Frone, Major, & Konar, 1989). Survey research shows that women tend to have lower career-entry and career-peak salary expectations than men (Major & Konar, 1984a). Experimental research demonstrates that women (as compared to men) tend to pay themselves less for equivalent labor and work longer with fewer errors for equivalent pay (Major et al., 1984b). Both effects are related to mental comparisons with same-sex others, which tend to anchor men at higher compensation points than women (Major & Forcey, 1985; McFarlin et al., 1989). Consistent with the results of the MBA field study by Bowles et al. (2005) discussed above, these effects are moderated by the degree of ambiguity about appropriate compensation standards. The entitlement effect dissipates when men and women have the same comparison information (Major et al., 1984b). When there is ambiguity about appropriate pay standards, gender-linked expectations fill in the blanks (Major et al., 1984b).

Some negotiation studies have related gender differences in salary aspirations to gender differences in negotiation behavior and performance. In a negotiation simulation with MBA students, Barron (2003) found that women reported lower pay entitlement and a greater need to prove themselves on the job than men, and that such feelings predicted lower salary requests. In a job interview preparation simulation with undergraduates, Kaman and Hartel (1994) found that men reported higher pay expectations than women and that pay expectations were correlated

with anticipated negotiation behaviors, such as not accepting the first offer and negotiating for the highest salary possible. In a negotiation simulation with MBA students, Stevens, Bavetta and Gist (1993) found women negotiated lower salaries than men because they entered the negotiation with lower negotiation aspirations. These results are consistent with numerous other negotiation studies showing that negotiation expectations are predictive of negotiation outcomes (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). If job negotiations expectations are higher for men than women, then job negotiation outcomes are likely to be as well (Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin, 1984c).

**Prescriptive and descriptive sex stereotypes.** Prescriptive and descriptive sex stereotypes inform expectations about how men and women should and will behave, respectively (Burgess & Borgida, 1999). Reflective of their relative social and economic status, men are expected to be assertive, forceful and in charge, and women are expected to behave in a more deferential, agreeable manner (Eagly, 1987; Eagly et al., 1984; Jackman, 1994). As discussed earlier, the masculine stereotype is well aligned with the attributes of the effective negotiator, but the feminine stereotype largely contradicts them. This creates a double-bind for women in job negotiations (Wade, 2001). Women who take a stereotypically masculine approach and advocate assertively for their self-interest defy the prescriptions of feminine niceness, and women who fulfill the feminine stereotype are unlikely to be effective negotiators.

Prescriptive sex stereotypes make attempting to negotiate for higher compensation a more socially risky endeavor for women than for men. In a series of experiments, Bowles, Babcock and Lei (2007) asked participants to evaluate job candidates who either attempted to negotiate for higher compensation or allowed an opening to negotiate pass without comment. Across all of the experiments, participants were significantly less inclined to work with a woman who had attempted to negotiate as compared to one who had stayed mum, and male participants



consistently penalized women more than men for attempting to negotiate. When the researchers asked study participants to adopt the candidate's perspective, women were significantly less inclined than men to negotiate with a male evaluator (i.e., under those circumstances in which they faced a consistently higher social risk).

Descriptive sex stereotypes tend to influence negotiation performance through a dynamic of fulfilled expectations. Inspired by Claude Steele's work on stereotype threat (Steele, 1997), Kray, Thompson and Galinsky (2001) demonstrated that the implicit (i.e., below the level of conscious awareness) activation of stereotypes favoring male performance, coupled with the suggestion that the negotiation task was evaluative of general negotiation ability, exacerbates the male advantage in negotiation performance in mixed-sex pairs. In a subsequent series of studies, Kray, Galinsky and Thompson (2002) used a job negotiation simulation to show that they could reverse the male advantage in negotiation performance by subtly introducing atypical associations between gender and negotiation performance (e.g., suggesting a female advantage or male disadvantage) prior to a negotiation task. In another study based on a job negotiation simulation, Kray, Thompson and Galinsky (2001) demonstrated that the overt introduction of stereotypes favoring male performance in negotiation reversed the male advantage in negotiation performance, by eliciting a form of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) in which female negotiators responded by negotiating more competitively in defiance of the stereotype.

### **Summary**

In sum, the effects of gender on job negotiations are reflective of men's and women's relative social and economic status. Employers and candidates alike associate men with higher pay than women. This is evident from the gender differences in aspirations that male and female candidates set for themselves, as well as in the offer behavior of those who disperse

compensation. The influence of the social structure of gender relations is also evident in the responses that evaluators have to men's and women's attempts to negotiate for higher pay—with men's attempts generally perceived as acceptable, particularly by men, and women's perceived as inappropriate. Because gender differences in job negotiation performance stem from the social hierarchy of gender relations as opposed to innate differences, they are situationally labile—greater when negotiators have little objective information to guide them through the negotiation and sensitive to implicit associations between gender and negotiation performance.

### **WIDENING THE INVESTIGATIVE LENS**

In the following two sections, we expose more of the stage on which job negotiations take place. In the first section, we open the curtain on the private realm by reviewing research on the relationship between intra-household bargaining and job market participation. In the following section, we shine the spotlight on some of the organizational structures and practices that define jobs by reviewing research on gender in collective bargaining.

#### **Intra-household Bargaining**

The literature on intra-household bargaining speaks to the most intractable barrier to gender equality in the workplace—the inequitable distribution of household labor (Becker, 1985). Intra-organizational negotiations of workplace roles and compensation are intertwined with intra-household negotiations of domestic roles and responsibilities (e.g., child care, cleaning, cooking) (Bartley, Blanton, & Gilliard, 2005; Biernat & Wortman, 1991; Hochschild, 1990, 1997). Women's workforce participation has increased in recent decades and the proportions of household duties carried out by men and women have grown closer. However, working women still bear a disproportionate level of responsibility for household tasks relative to men (Bartley et al., 2005; Berk & Berk, 1983; Biernat et al., 1991; Blair & Lichter, 1991;

Hochschild, 1990), and this greater responsibility for household labor is significantly related to their lesser earnings (Becker, 1985; Hersch & Stratton, 1994).

Research in economics and sociology concurs on evidence regarding inequities in the negotiated distribution of household responsibilities, but the two literatures posit different underlying explanations for these inequities. Economists tend to interpret outcomes in intra-household bargaining as reflections of earning power outside the home (Hersch et al., 1994; Manser & Brown, 1980). Studies in this tradition show how changes in men's and women's relative earning power outside of the home predict changes in the allocation of labor inside of the home. While acknowledging the influence of earning power, sociologists tend to interpret gender ideology as the central driver in negotiations over household labor (Berk et al., 1983). Research in this vein points to the weakness of the relationship between women's earning power and household allocations, and offers theoretical and empirical evidence of greater effects for cultural norms assigning gender to household tasks. In both research paradigms, household members are seen as actively negotiating the assignment of duties, but household inequities are much more malleable in the bargaining power model than they are in the gender ideology model.

**Bargaining power models of intra-household bargaining.** Bargaining power research models the distribution of household labor and resources as a multi-person allocation task in which decisions made by household partners are affected by the competitive labor market outside the home (Elul, Silva-Reus & Volij, 2002). In these models, the unequal allocation of household labor explains and is explained by the persistent wage gap between men and women. Put simply, this research offers evidence linking women's losses in the negotiations at home and in the market place (Elul, Silva-Reus, & Volij, 2002). Both men and women pay a price in the workplace for taking on responsibility within the household, but these negative payoffs affect

women in far greater numbers (Mahoney, 1995). Bargaining power models predict that as women earn more outside the home, they will gain power in negotiations around household decisions (Bianchi, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Neuman, 1991).

Hersch and Stratton (1994)'s research is illustrative. They investigated differentials in household work and wages based on seven years and over 6,000 survey responses from White, male, married workers. Regression analyses revealed a cycle of intra-household bargaining perpetuating wage differentials and wage differentials reinforcing decisions in household allocations. Hersch and Stratton (1994) found that women tend to marry men who have higher earning power and that the unequal allocation of household work reflects this unequal earning power. The time and attention dedicated to the household puts these women at a disadvantage in the labor force, so the women continue to earn less than their husbands, and the cycle continues. Their data suggest that even the anticipation of greater household responsibilities for women over their lifetime plays a part in women's human capital investment decisions and career outcomes relative to men of equal marketability (Hersch & Stratton, 1994). Women earn less on average than men because they invest less in the human capital (e.g., work experience) necessary to increase their earnings (Becker, 1985; Hersch et al., 1994). Even after controlling for gender differences in human capital characteristics and investments, however, time spent on housework has a direct negative effect on earnings, and this effect is stronger for women than men (Hersch & Stratton, 1994).

**Gender ideology in intra-household bargaining.** Sociologists reviewing economic research on intra-household bargaining argue that focusing on individual labor-market alternatives ignores the culturally-driven power differences in gender relations that undergird intra-household bargaining dynamics (Berk et al., 1983). Empirical work on gender ideology in

household bargaining suggests that the bargaining power model cannot completely explain intra-household bargaining due to its lack of attention to social norms (Blair et al., 1991; Kamo, 1988; Parkman, 2004). Changes in household income contribution do not have a straightforward effect on the distribution of domestic work between males and females in the household (Bartley et al., 2005). Men do take on some additional housework as women increase their earnings outside the home, but women continue to carry a disproportionate share of household responsibility regardless of contribution to household income. This conclusion is supported by research varying from small-set interview studies (e.g., Court, 1997) to large-scale survey studies. In a study based on over 4,000 surveys of married men and women, DeMaris and Longmore (1996) found that ideology and considerations of equity trumped effects for wives' alternatives outside the household, suggesting that partners' negotiations over household work are constrained by gender role beliefs regardless of women's earnings. Stier and Lewis-Epstein (2000), studying Israeli couples with children, found that only full-time employment provides women sufficient bargaining leverage to renegotiate household responsibilities. These authors argue that women's part-time participation in the external labor market reinforces, rather than changes, the traditional division of household labor.

Strober and Chan (1998) surveyed 1980-1982 graduates of Stanford University and the University of Todai (Japan). Four-hundred-and-four male and 330 female graduates from Stanford, and 388 male and 190 female graduates from Todai responded to the surveys. Strober and Chan's regression results suggest that negotiations within households may be starting to reflect women's increased market power, at least in high-earning dual-career couples in the U.S. Over 40 percent of the Stanford graduates in their sample reported roughly equal shares of household tasks for husbands and wives, a proportion much higher than the rate reported in

previous research. This rate rises for couples with no children and for those in which the woman works full time outside the home. The rate of equal share of household labor in Japan, however, remained below 15 percent, even for dual-earning couples in which the wife worked full time. Pointing to the consistency between their results and society-level ideologies in the U.S. and Japan, Strober and Chan conclude that: “changes in societal ideology are a prerequisite for changes in behavior, even for highly educated couples, and even when women have some economic bargaining power” (1998: 122).

Cohen’s (1998) findings, based on the U.S. national consumer expenditure survey, add an important detail to Strober and Chan’s conclusions. This research reveals the source of some of the increased balance between men’s and women’s inputs into household labor in the U.S.: as women’s contribution to household income increases, the amount spent on dining out and external sources of household help increases (Cohen, 1998). These results point to total household income as a constraint in intra-household bargaining dynamics. To the extent that norms are beginning to shift in the U.S., it seems likely that this new ideology is being played out largely in relatively high income households. The majority of households cannot settle intra-household bargaining problems by paying for others to do their cooking, cleaning and childcare (Coleman & Rippin, 2000).

High earnings are not, however, a sufficient condition for an equitable distribution of household labor (Biernat et al., 1991). Some research suggests a curvilinear relationship between women’s earnings relative to men’s, and their proportion of household labor. Based on an extensive diary study in Australia and the U.S., Bittman et al. (2003) found that as female earnings rose above male earnings, men actually reduced their household tasks. These authors infer that women are doing additional household work to compensate for deviating from gender

roles in employment. Court's (1997) interviews with female educators in New Zealand support Bittman et al.'s (2003) conclusion. Court (1997) found that women report taking on extra work at home, in part, to compensate for breaking socially constructed gendered roles outside of the home. Brines (1994) explores this same finding from the men's perspective, and concludes that men whose earnings are lesser than their spouse's "do gender" (West & Zimmerman, 1987) at home by sticking closely to traditionally gendered allocations of household tasks. Evertsson and Nermo (2004), studying this question using national survey data from the U.S. and Sweden, also found strong gender effects for the distribution of household work, with women taking on the majority of household work regardless of contribution to household income. Providing nuance to Bittman et al.'s (2003) findings regarding the shape of these effects, Evertsson and Nermo (2004) found that the curvilinear effect for relatively high-wage women (in households where the woman earns more than the man) held in the U.S. but not in Sweden, suggesting a cultural influence in gender norms. In contrast to Bittman et al.'s (2003) conclusion about the underlying reason for this effect, Evertsson and Nermo (2004) propose that American women who earn more than their husbands are compensating for their husband's gender deviance outside the home, rather than for their own. While the underlying motivations are still being debated, these studies concur that gender roles are being played out in negotiations at home and at work in interactive and complex ways by both men and women.

Numerous other studies also address this critical question of why gendered social norms around household work persist in spite of additional bargaining power held by women working outside the home. Dixon and Wetherell (2004) argue that the persistence of gender inequalities in domestic labor reflect men's and women's sense of fairness in close relationships. Hiller and Philliber's (1986) surveys of 489 couples suggest that both men and women are willing to take

on some of the roles of the other gender, but are loathe to relinquish tasks that are gender-consistent—women may be more willing to take on tasks such as home repair than they are to give up tasks such as cooking the family dinner. Parkman's (2004) analysis of over 3,000 responses by married men and women to the 1987 and 1988 U.S. National Survey of Families and Households suggests an interaction between bargaining power and gender ideology. Using regressions controlling for market power and marriage longevity, Parkman shows that women spend roughly twice as much time on household tasks, but only on those tasks, such as childcare and cooking, that are considered "women's work." Parkman (2004) concludes that spouses place a higher utility on maintaining the strength of the marriage, an objective that is partially met by fulfilling traditional gender roles, than on marginal increases in net household income.

Kelly and Shorthall's (2002) study of Northern Irish farmers' wives working outside the farm to supplement farm income provides an unusually detailed look into the ways in which women's employment and gender ideology interact in intra-household bargaining. Based on data from 107 participants in 12 focus groups, Kelly and Shorthall find that women's "off-farm" work is intended, by both women and men, to uphold rather than upset traditional gender roles on the farm. These authors argue that negotiations around household labor are aimed at optimizing at the level of the household, reflecting and reinforcing gendered norms regarding the allocation of tasks. Kelly and Shortall conclude that, "cognizance must be taken of historical context, power and gender relations, and bonds of affection. Our research indicates that farm women in Northern Ireland are committed to their families and their farms, and engage in strategies to maintain the survival and well-being of both" (2002: 341).

**Summary and research implications.** Resounding out of both the bargaining power and the gender ideology traditions is the conclusion that gender differences in power and status in the



workplace are inextricably and recursively linked to power differences between men and women in intra-household bargaining. Part of this recursive dynamic between power at work and power at home is related directly to labor market earning potential: to maximize household income, partners with greater earning ability (typically men) do a lesser share of the household labor. Allocations of household labor along traditional gender lines have been more intransigent than rational models would predict, however, reflecting the strength of traditional gender roles and ideologies within families and social cultures.

The literature on intra-household bargaining suggests that job negotiations—and career-related negotiations, more broadly—might be more fruitfully conceived as two-level games (Putnam, 1988) in which job candidates negotiate with a fixed set of resources (e.g., time) across both levels. At Level 1, candidates and employers work out the terms of the candidate's labor commitment outside of the home, and, at Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners over the candidate's share of household labor. For reasons outlined above, the candidate's gender and family status are likely to moderate the degree to which Level 2 negotiations pose constraints on Level 1 negotiations.

It warrants emphasis, however, that the two levels need not be in zero-sum conflict. Even though more time spent on domestic labor constrains the time available for work outside of the home and vice versa, there is the potential to negotiate employment arrangements that create value across the domains (e.g., see Rousseau, 2005 on "i-deals"). For example, Deloitte and Touche, USA has instituted a practice of "Mass Career Customization," which builds individualized career paths around each professional's career-life goals. The customization allows employees to adjust career pace, workload, location/travel and role over time, in response to changes in life away from work. The adjustments are designed to have positive effects on

individuals' home lives, their careers, and their loyalty to and longevity at Deloitte and Touche. As suggested by this example, a two-level-game perspective could shed light on opportunities as well as constraints in the negotiation of work between the public and the private spheres.

### **Collective Bargaining**

The literature on collective bargaining raises the examination of the role of gender in job negotiations to the institutional level. This literature illuminates the potential for negotiation to be a mechanism for systemic change toward greater gender parity. Since the 1970s, labor unions have been vocal advocates for gender pay equity (Tarr-Whelan, 1978; Thomas, 1986), comparable worth (Horrigan & Harriman, 1988), and women's career advancement (Figart, 1989) as strategies for eliminating sex discrimination in organizations. The clearest measure of union progress in this regard is the reduction of the gender wage gap associated with unionized work forces. While collective bargaining does not eliminate the gap (Le Grand, 1991; Smith, 1992; Sosin, Rives, & West, 1998), there is evidence that collective bargaining helps to reduce gender differentials in compensation (Benedict, 1999; Gesine & Knut, 2005; Harbridge & Thickett, 2003; Smith, 1992; Sosin et al., 1998)—even if only by raising the wages of the lowest paid workers, among whom women are disproportionately represented (Blau & Kahn, 2003).

Research on the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a mechanism for promoting gender equality in the workplace suggests that union effectiveness depends both on the gender dynamics within the unions themselves and the receptivity of the broader institutional context to progress on gender issues. In the first of the following two sections, we review literature on the role of gender within union organizations and its implications for collective bargaining on gender issues. In the second section, we highlight some general features of the institutional context of collective bargaining that influence union effectiveness in advocating for gender equality.

**Gender dynamics within unions.** One fundamental factor in collective bargaining for gender equality is the proportional representation of women within a given labor union. One might imagine that the greater the proportion of women, the more effective the union would be at advocating for women's causes, but the research findings are not so clear cut. For instance, Elvira and Saporta (2001) found that, in six of nine U.S. manufacturing industries studied, unionization reduced the gender gap in wages for blue-collar workers. Women in female-dominated establishments and industries, however, did not benefit as much from unionization as women in gender-balanced or male-dominated contexts. Elvira and Saporta interpret this finding as reflecting a relative weakness at the bargaining table on the part of female-dominated unions.

Another study by Harbridge and Thickett (2003) suggests a different implication of female domination in union representation. In their study of collective bargaining in New Zealand, they found that settlements covering predominately female populations of workers produced more advantageous family leave agreements than did settlements covering predominately male populations, suggesting that female workers may be willing to trade off pay for other type of benefits. Similarly, Heery and Kelly (1988) found that female union officers were more likely to prioritize non-pay-related issues (e.g., child care, maternity leave and sexual harassment) in collective bargaining than their male colleagues. Based on non-participant observations of union officials at four of Britain's largest unions and surveys of full-time trade union officials from 69 unions, Heery and Kelly concluded that female officers aimed "to widen the scope of collective bargaining to embrace questions such as sexual politics at the workplace and the integration of women's paid and domestic work" (1988: 503).

Others argue that female representation and participation in union organizing—even at the highest levels of union leadership—is not sufficient in itself to make a significant difference.

While pay equity and the sex segregation of occupations have become mainstream topics in labor activism, unions themselves are gendered organizations dominated by men and masculine conceptions of work (Creese, 1995; Danieli, 2006; Jones, 2002; Wajcman, 2000). Based on a review of reports and studies on collective bargaining and the promotion of workplace equality, Dickens concluded that, “In the debate about the future of unions, the need to attract and retain groups such as women is generally noted as necessary, but the transformation which this calls for on the part of unions in terms of existing power structures, union culture, agendas and priorities is less often recognized” (2000: 41). Feminist theorists of industrial relations make the case that one cannot fully understand the potential for unions to advocate for gender equality without deconstructing the masculine hegemony within the labor movement itself (Danieli, 2006) and analyzing how “the very nature of jobs and the organization of the labour market are intimately tied to the nature of gender relations within the family” (Wajcman, 2000: 196).

Through analysis of a collective bargaining case study, Creese (1995) developed the argument that, rather than thinking in terms of promoting women and women’s issues, unions should develop feminist principles of organizing. Creese studied the negotiations between a white-collar union and a Canadian utility company during a period of corporate restructuring. In spite of self-identified “feminist” union leadership, Creese demonstrated ways in which the union’s traditional principles of employment security and seniority protections systematically disadvantaged female workers, for instance, by converting part-time to full-time contracts and reducing the flexibility of work hours. Creese and other labor relations scholars argue that part-time work is a labor category which is treated as gender neutral, but is clearly gendered in practice (e.g., Danieli, 2006; Wajcman, 2000). The lower wages and weaker protections for part-time labor reflect traditional conceptions of female labor as a supplement in households with

male breadwinners (Wajcman, 2000). Creese concluded that even those who favor the inclusion of women and women's issues in union activism overlook the gendered implications of traditional practices and fail to recognize the diversity of union members as "whole people [with home and work lives] who do not come to the workplace as equal individuals" (1995: 163).

Other field studies further reinforce the contention that increased participation of women in the labor movement is insufficient to motivate unions to work toward rectifying gender disparities. Studying the influence of women's involvement in trade union leadership in the UK, Dorgan and Grieco (1993) concluded that the elevation of women to union leadership positions does not assure stronger advocacy for women's issues. Based on interview and questionnaire data, Dorgan and Grieco proposed that, while the ascension of women to leadership positions in unions was a sign of the growing importance of gender issues to the trade-union movement, the female leaders' struggles to attain and maintain leadership positions necessitated assimilation into the dominant system and convergence toward support for traditional issues. Consistent with Kanter's classic work on the dilemmas of "tokenism" (Kanter, 1977a), Dorgan and Grieco concluded that it may be too much to ask of a newly emergent generation of female union leaders to become vocal advocates for women's causes.

Based on a survey of 538 paid officers from 19 unions in the UK, Heery (2006) concluded that participation in equal pay negotiations was predicted less by the gender of the officer than it was by exposure to the voice of female workers, in terms of their distinctive experiences and specific interests, and the officer's personal commitment to the principles of equal pay. Drawing inferences from case studies of pay equity bargaining in two Canadian provinces, Hart similarly concluded that cultivating expertise in gender issues was critical to union effectiveness at the negotiating table:

The unions which were the most effective in enhancing their power to represent women's interests used not only their conventional bargaining techniques but also utilized the key tools of gender analysis and expertise in pay equity methodology, developed primarily through their negotiators' formal links with internal equality structures and knowledge of equality policies, combined with women's networking inside and outside the labour movement. Given the complexity of the pay equity methodology and the resilience of hierarchy embedded in the collective bargaining process, negotiators who could bring these resources to the table and maintain commitment to the aim of tackling women's discriminatory wages were crucial (2002b: 623).

In sum, this literature suggests that unions are more effective agents of change toward enhanced gender equity when they adopt a learning stance toward gender inequalities (Ely & Thomas, 2001) and develop capacity within their own as well as target organizations to address the complexity of gender issues.

**Institutional factors.** The details of the legal, regulatory and judicial context of collective bargaining are intricately complex and beyond the scope of this chapter. But the collective bargaining literature does point to two general categories of institutional factors that influence union effectiveness in promoting gender equality in the workplace. They are the degree of centralization and cross-union collaboration in labor activism and the openness of target institutions at the negotiating table.

The degree of centralization and cross-union collaboration in collective action influences the level at which gender issues are addressed (e.g., industry, occupational category, etc.), and the corresponding flexibility that negotiators have to develop firm-specific solutions. At the macro level, for instance, Meng and Meurs (2004) compared the influence of firm wage policies on the gender earnings gap in France and Australia. France had a relatively centralized system of collective bargaining, whereas Australia had experienced a recent decentralization trend. They found that firm wage policies, as well as union strength, were more influential in reducing the gender earnings gap in Australia's relatively decentralized system than in France.

Based on a case study of union activism in the electricity supply industry in the UK, Gilbert and Secker (1995) argued that decentralization of union negotiations may facilitate the promotion of gender equity concerns by allowing more flexibility in union strategy to address complex issues, such as comparable worth. This is particularly the case when local unions are more progressive in their understanding and promotion of gender equity than the national organizations. On the other hand, Gilbert and Secker also described how a lack of collaboration across labor organizations impeded discussions of comparable worth, because the different labor organizations reflected the sex-segregation of occupations. Wage negotiations took place within occupational categories, which hampered discussions of comparable worth across occupations (e.g., entry-level wages for administration vs. crafts). Other work suggests that unions make more progress on gender equality issues in coordinated, cross-firm or nationally centralized actions than in firm-level bargaining, because of the combined strength of the unions in coordinated actions (Heery, 2006; Whitehouse, 1992).

The openness of target organizations to addressing potentially transformational gender issues is another clear factor in the influence of collective bargaining. Union negotiators need willing partners on the opposite side of the negotiating table to engage in the arduous work of reexamining and adapting traditional organizational practices and structures (Gilbert et al., 1995; Hart, 2002a, b; Heery, 2006; Horrigan et al., 1988). Some authors, such as Benedict (1999), caution against drawing the causal inference that union activism itself reduces gender pay disparities, observing that those organizations most likely to associate with collective bargaining may be those most willing address gender issues. Others argue persuasively that relying on regulations and the business case alone is not sufficient, and that unions have a critical catalyzing role to play in articulating the case for gender equality and in motivating the hard work of

opening minds and making change on difficult issues, such as defining and implementing “equal pay” and “comparable worth” (Colling & Dickens, 1998; Hart, 2002b; Whitehouse, 1992; Whitehouse, Zetlin, & Earnshaw, 2001).

**Summary and research implications.** As one industrial relations scholar concluded, “The unions’ involvement is patchy and variable but they are a force pressing for greater pay equity” (Heery, 2006: 539). The effectiveness of collective bargaining as a mechanism for enhancing gender equality in the workplace is contingent on the readiness and willingness of labor negotiators to examine and address gender issues in their own, as well as in employer, organizations. Even when the will and readiness to tackle difficult gender issues is present, union effectiveness hinges on the ability of labor coalitions to bring pressure on employer organizations and on the presence of potential partners across the negotiating table. Credit must be shared with employer organizations who negotiate with the unions and with the legislative, regulatory, and judicial bodies that set in place the incentives for negotiation.

Given the declining role of unions in the U.S. and internationally (Troy, 2001), we are less convinced by this literature that collective bargaining is *the* vehicle for promoting gender equality in the workplace than we are persuaded that there are insights to be gained from the study of collective bargaining with regard to what it looks like to negotiate the structure of work at the institutional level. Perhaps the most important insight from this literature is the benefit of adopting a learning perspective in the process of renegotiating long-established, taken-for-granted, and value-laden work practices. The collective bargaining literature suggests that successfully addressing organizational inequities through negotiation is likely to require an artful combination of pressure and collaborative learning. Negotiation scholars could take inspiration from this work as well as research on organizational sensemaking (Weick, 1995), team learning



(Edmondson, 1999), and diversity perspectives (Ely et al., 2001) to generate hypotheses about the organizational and interpersonal practices that might facilitate the renegotiation of institutionalized structures and practices that contribute to gender inequities in the distribution of organizational resources and career opportunities.

## DISCUSSION

We return to our opening question: what could research on gender in negotiation tell us about gender inequality in organizations? Each of the literatures reviewed offers insights into gender inequalities in organizations. Taken together, they suggest numerous directions for future research in organizational behavior – both to better understand and to reduce gender inequities.

The literature on gender in job negotiations helps to explain gender differences in compensation among managers and professionals. It also suggests explanations for the gender asymmetric distribution of other types of negotiable resources and career opportunities within organizations. This literature shows that, even before any interaction takes place, gender is likely to influence the negotiation expectations of those who control the organizational resources and opportunities as well as of those who seek them. Particularly in contexts in which resources and opportunities tend to flow to men—for instance, because the industry, occupation or organizational hierarchy is male dominated—the expectations for men to receive such organizational benefits are likely to be higher than for women, and prenegotiation expectations tend to predict outcomes. Even if men and women have the same aspirations, gendered behavioral norms may constrain women from negotiating as effectively as men. For instance, concerned about the social risks of negotiating, women may be more reticent than their male peers to request greater resources and career opportunities.

From this literature, we observe two general mechanisms for how organizational leaders might minimize the potential for negotiation dynamics to contribute to gender inequities within their organizations. First, enhancing the transparency with regard to what can be negotiated is likely to reduce gender differences. Gender differences in negotiation performance tend to be greater the more ambiguity there is about the appropriate standards for agreement. Second, organizational leaders can make themselves more aware of how traditional norms and practices trigger gendered expectations and behavior in the negotiation of organizational resources and opportunities. Ambiguity and gender triggers work in interaction with one another, with the highest likelihood of effect occurring when the standards for agreement are ambiguous and the environment is rife with gendered cues that negotiators use—consciously or unconsciously—to inform their negotiation expectations (Bowles et al., 2005).

Research on intra-household bargaining shows that gender differences in job negotiation outcomes should also be interpreted in light of gender differences in the division of caregiving and other forms of domestic labor. Economic research shows that inequitable distributions of household labor between men and women fuel and are fueled by inequitable job market outcomes. Sociological research shows how culture and gender ideology further reinforce the gendered division of labor within and outside of the home. Researchers in organizational behavior could incorporate household-level negotiations into their research on gender in job negotiations. In doing so, they might illuminate creative solutions for addressing what is, perhaps, the most formidable barrier to gender inequality in the workplace.

The collective bargaining literature gives negotiation and organizational scholars insight into what it looks like to negotiate systemic changes in organizations toward greater gender equality. This literature suggests that prescriptions to enhance transparency and reduce gender

triggers are likely to be difficult to implement, and that the pursuit of such aims should start with learning about how organizational norms and practices privilege some to the disadvantage of others (e.g., part-time vs. full-time labor). This research and other literature on the psychology of legitimation of status hierarchies (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Kay, 2005; Major et al., 2002) shows that the barriers to recognition of inequitable systems and practices run deeper than material self-interest, and that those for and against changing the status quo are likely to include both the privileged and the disadvantaged. Making transparent what is normative or taken-for-granted and relabeling the traditional as discriminatory calls for collective learning among, as opposed to between, men and women.

Both the intra-household bargaining and collective bargaining literatures open windows onto organizational populations that are effectively ignored by the literature on gender in job negotiations. The literature on gender in job negotiations from psychology and organizational behavior focuses on managerial and professional employees and is based primarily on North American samples. The intra-household bargaining and collective bargaining literatures describe a broader array of organizational actors in a variety of national contexts. While the terms of pay and work for lower level positions tend to be less negotiable than those for higher level positions, negotiation is still likely to play interesting and materially important roles in men's and women's differential work experiences below the managerial ranks (e.g., influencing work hours or shifts, training or promotion opportunities). Moreover, economists predict that organizational populations at all levels will become increasingly international (Blinder, 2006; Freeman, 2006). Valuable research contributions could be made by examining how culture moderates gender effects in negotiation. Researchers could take inspiration from the studies described above on how culture-linked gender ideologies influence tradeoffs between domestic and organizational

labor, as well as from broader investigations of how gender stereotypes vary with national differences in gender equality (e.g., Glick et al., 2000; Glick et al., 2004).

Research tapping more of the potential for gender in negotiation to help explain gender inequality in the workplace could take many forms. Experimental researchers could construct laboratory situations that mimic organizational structures, cultures or processes, and incorporate testable propositions from the intra-household and collective bargaining literatures into their experimental designs (e.g., using two-level bargaining games between home and employer, priming of gender ideology, manipulations of learning perspectives). The critical difference between what is commonly done now and what we are proposing is that experimental researchers study gender in negotiation with the objective of shedding light on organizational processes as opposed to human behavior more broadly (Heath & Sitkin, 2001) and that they actively draw inspiration from and help to shape field research (Chatman & Flynn, 2005).

Field researchers interested in negotiation and gender inequality in organizations might find hosts within organizations searching for ways to retain and motivate workers. Quantitative field researchers could examine the relationship between organizational structures and practices (e.g., ambiguity and gender triggers) and their effects on gender differences in the distribution of negotiable resources and career opportunities for managers and professionals (see, for example, the research designs of Lyness & Thompson, 1997; 2000, which do not focus on negotiation but examine gender differences in career-related resources and experiences). Taking a broader organizational perspective, quantitative field researchers could also compare and contrast negotiation processes and outcomes across organizational structures and at multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy (see, for example, Elvira & Graham, 2002).

Because the study of gender in negotiation has been so heavily focused on compensation, we also perceive an opportunity for qualitative field researchers to explore how gender in negotiation influences the distribution of other status-linked and less easily measured resources and career opportunities. Qualitative researchers might even adopt a negotiated social order perspective (Strauss, 1978), and focus not only on explicit negotiations but also on the myriad of implicitly negotiated interactions in organizational life that constitute and reconstitute the social hierarchy (Giddens, 1979). Qualitative research could draw inspiration as well from the study of topics, such as issue selling (Ashford, 1998; Dutton & Ashford, 1993), tempered radicalism (Meyerson, 2001), and interest-group advocacy over gender issues (Scully & Creed, 1999) in order to examine the role of negotiation in motivating and shaping institutional-level change toward greater gender equality.

### CONCLUSION

We perceive considerable untapped potential in the study of gender in negotiation for understanding the roots of and responses to gender inequality in organizations. Realizing that potential will require more than simply contextualizing the study of gender in negotiation more deeply within organizations (Heath et al., 2001). We argue that it would require broadening the lens of investigation: first, by examining the implications of gender in job negotiations for the distribution of organizational resources and career opportunities beyond compensation; second, by taking into account the influence of intra-household bargaining on men's and women's individual job and other career-related negotiations; and, third, by exploring the potential for the collective-level negotiation of gendered work practices. We hope that researchers will take inspiration from this chapter to examine the role of negotiation as a mechanism for the construction and deconstruction of gender inequality in organizations.

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Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Hannah Riley Bowles, Harvard Kennedy School, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138. Email: [hannah\\_bowles@harvard.edu](mailto:hannah_bowles@harvard.edu)

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